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	31 January 1984	
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD		
	elect Committee on Intelligence n the Central American Finding	
<ol> <li>On 31 January 1984, the HPSCI on the Central Ame Committee Members were prese</li> </ol>	at 0930 a hearing was conducted with erican Finding. The following ent:	th
Chairman Edward P. Bolan Anthony Beilenson, (D., J. Kenneth Robinson (R., G. William Whitehurst (Louis Stokes (D., OH) C.W. Bill Young (R., FL Bob Stump (R., AZ)	(R., VA)	
2. Committee Staffers p	oresent were:	
Thomas Latimer, Staff Di Duane Andrews Richard Giza Bernard Raimo	rector Mike O'Neil, Chief Counse James Bush Steve Berry, Minority Counsel	<b>=</b> 1
3. Representatives from	the Department of State were:	
Deputy Secretary, Kennet DAS, Bill Knepper, INR DAS, Jim Michael DAS, Ed Fox John Wyant, INR	h Dam	
4. Present from the Cen	tral Intelligence Agency (CIA) were	<b>:</b>
Duane Clarridge, Chief, Deputy D	tor for Operations (DDO) Latin America Division (C/LA) Director for Intelligence, Latin (DDI/LA)	
APPROVED FOR RELEASE		

APPROVED FOR DATE: APR 200





- The hearing, in which a transcript was taken, was opened by Chairman Boland citing the fact that there was a \$24 mil cap on expenditures for the Nicaragua program and that over half of the funds had already been obligated. Mr. Boland said that during this hearing he would like to hear the witnesses give an assessment of the past four months of activity and to comment on how or if the Administration plans to seek additional funds. This Memorandum (MFR) should be read in conjunction with the 26 January 1984 MFR covering the staff prebriefing on the same subject.
- Ken Dam was the first witness who briefed from a 6. prepared statement on U.S. policy in Central America, particularly Nicaragua, and how the State Department saw the Nicaragua program as an essential ingredient in this policy. Mr. Dam said that, at present, there were four main elements to our policy in Nicaragua; support of democracies, economic development, negotiating a settlement, and providing a security shield around Nicaragua so that the other three Central American countries would have a chance to survive. The success of our policy depends on major changes taking place inside Nicaragua. Mr. Dam said the U.S. Government has four aims with regard to Nicaragua:
  - (1), end Nicaraguan support to Salvadoran guerrilla groups;
  - sever Nicaraguan military and security ties to Cuba and the Soviet Bloc;
  - (3) reduce the overall levels of military forces in the area; and,
  - force Nicaragua to carry out their original promise of democratic pluralism.

Mr. Dam said Nicaragua has been intransigent. He said the U.S. was Nicaragua's principal supporter at the time of the successful revolution, but they have consistently rebuffed our economic incentives, which has led us to take a harder stand against the regime. Mr. Dam said the Nicaraguan program is responsible for pressuring the Nicaraguans to seek a peaceful settlement. The Nicaraguans have signed onto the Contradora Twenty-One Points, are easing internal controls, and appear to be stepping away from Cuba. Mr. Dam said he was optimistic over the situation in Central America because other Central American countries are actively encouraging the peace process. On 7 January the "Core Four" and Nicaragua formed three working groups to work out a plan which is due by 1 April 1984 on what major steps will be taken in the peace process. Mr. Dam concluded by saying it was essential to continue keeping the pressure on Nicaraqua and to show U.S. support for the entire region.

7.	DDO, John Stein said our prime goal, at this point, is
	between the FDN and ARDE; both groups are separate
entitle	s, but they are jointly planning field activities.
•	
8. status	Mr. Stein then briefed the Committee on the current of the three groups:
EDM	
FDN	
(1)	
(2)	
(3) (4)	
(4)	
Mis	ura
(1)	Activity among the Misura has not changed dramatically
(2)	during the past four months.
(2)	
Pas	<u>tora</u>
(1)	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
(2)	
(3)	General lower level of activity.
(4)	In mid-January, Pastora ordered a standown in an
	attempt to force the U.S. to designate him as the
/5\	overall commander and leader of the Contra forces.
(5)	
Mr. Ste	in concluded by saying we will continue to apply overall
pressure	e against the Nicaraguan regime
9.	Chairman Boland opened the question and answer period by
	that as far as he was concerned the key to Central
America	's problem is El Salvador, not Nicaragua.
	Mw Doland and
that ag	Mr. Boland said tar as he was concerned El Salvador was critical and
	must do something to provide economic and military

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assistance so they can carry on with their election plans. Mr. Dam said that in talking with the leaders of Costa Rica and Honduras, they were concerned primarily with Nicaragua. He said that the pressure from the insurgency was an indispensible element in our policy in Central America. Mr. Dam also said that our Contra effort has cost Nicaragua \$30 to \$80 mil, and this burden will eventually, we believe, force Nicaragua to change its policies.

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10. question	The following points were made in a wide ranging and answer period:
(a)	In responding to a question of why expenditures for this program jumped from \$2.5 to \$5 mil in December, Mr. Clarridge said
(h)	The day have a second s
(b)	It is hard to project expenditures since we are basically reacting to the situation on the ground. costs could increase dramatically.
(c)	
(d)	
(e)	Mr. Clarridge said our instructions are to maintain pressure on the Nicaraguan regime, and we have not made any plans to slow up on our expenditures in anticipation of a funding shortfall in funds.
(f)	
(g)	
(h)	We have not reached a decision within the Administration whether to scale down activities, or seek additional funds before the \$24 mil runs out.





(i)	We have not held discussions with concerning the shortage of funds.
	concerning the shortage of funds.
(j)	
(k)	There has been public discussion in the region concerning HR 2760. We believe, however, that leaders in the region have focused on the need for our Nicaraguan
	program.
(1)	Nicaragua is supporting guerrilla movements in Costa Rica and Honduras, and has indirect links with the Guatemalan insurgency.
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